S
ince 2002, federal funding for public health preparedness has been provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to state, tribal, local, and territorial public health departments through the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative agreement. The PHEP cooperative agreement is the main source of funding used to develop and maintain the ability to respond to public health threats, including infectious diseases; natural disasters; and biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological events. 1 These funds, totaling more than $9 billion, have also been used to address specific threats, such as the 2009 H1N1 novel influenza A virus, Ebola virus disease, and Zika. [2] [3] [4] PHEP funds have supported a broad range of programs to complement and extend preparedness activities. A 2014 assessment conducted by CDC's Division of State and Local Readiness found that since September 11, 2001 , PHEP funds accounted for approximately 81% of the funding expended by jurisdictions to develop public health emergency operations centers. In terms of sustaining operations, CDC data indicate that PHEP funds accounted for 51% of awardees' overall 2014 budgets for maintaining electronic disease surveillance systems, 63% of overall 2014 budgets for the Laboratory Response Network's response to biological threats, and 88% of the network's response to chemical threats. 5 In March 2011, CDC promulgated 15 Public Health Preparedness Capabilities to serve as national public health preparedness standards. Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning provides state and local public health departments with guidance on planning and organizing their preparedness activities. 6 The 15 capabilities were developed on the basis of the peer-reviewed literature and the subject matter expertise of professionals working in public health preparedness at the federal, state, and local levels. The capabilities help ensure that federal preparedness funds are directed to priority areas within individual jurisdictions.
Previously published research provides few examples of awardees' use of the capabilities. In general, research indicates that health departments use the capabilities as a framework to structure preparedness and planning activities. The capabilities are part of a broader constellation of inputs that feed into planning activities. 7, 8 For example, some awardees use the capabilities to identify and fill gaps in their preparedness plans. 9 Others map current activities to the capabilities, allowing them to identify gaps and prioritize resources. 10, 11 Awardees also use the capabilities to organize response-for example, using the emergency operations coordination capability to facilitate partnerships, coordination, communication, and management of resources. 12 Current literature describes contextual factors with the potential to affect health departments' perception of the capabilities:
1. Leadership: the ability of leaders at multiple levels of the organization to promote or champion the capabilities. [13] [14] [15] 2. Partnerships: the ability of health departments to forge partnerships within the community, among different sectors, and across jurisdictions. 13, 14, 16 3. Organizational structure: the organizational attributes of the health department, including size and whether it is embedded in a centralized or decentralized system. [17] [18] [19] 4. Resources and structural capacity: capacity of the organization, including funding streams and their stability; capacity of the workforce; and facilities and other infrastructure (e.g., legal and administrative capacities). 14, 16, [19] [20] [21] 5. Data and evaluation: the ability to collect and use data to create an impact. 13, 16, 17, 21 In this report, we explore how health departments perceive the 15 Public Health Preparedness Capabilities, as well as how contextual factors affect these perceptions.
METHODS
We conducted an online survey and follow-up focus group with PHEP awardees to assess perceptions of the 15 Public Health Preparedness Capabilities.
Online Survey
The sampling frame included directors of public health preparedness programs in state (n = 50), local (n = 4 large metropolitan areas), and territorial (n = 8) health departments directly funded by the PHEP cooperative agreement. The research team developed an online survey as part of a larger study with the goal of improving the operational efficiency and effectiveness of PHEP and response. The survey was piloted by a subset of the PHEP awardees and revised on the basis of their feedback. Avar Consulting (Rockville, MD) distributed a link (URL) to the survey by e-mail in September 2015 to the preparedness directors responsible for managing each awardee's preparedness and emergency response program in each of the 62 jurisdictions, along with a cover sheet explaining the purpose and instructions for completing the survey. All materials were reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget and CDC's Human Research Protection Office.
To improve the response rate, potential respondents were contacted by Avar staff several times, through multiple channels. 22 An e-mail with a link to the survey was sent every 2 weeks for 6 weeks, and after 6 weeks, nonrespondents were contacted through e-mail and telephone by their PHEP project officer.
The survey consisted of 4 sections related to the content validity and utility of the capabilities and awardees' structural capacity and leadership. Respondents reported demographic information, including job title, job tenure, and number of public health emergency responses managed. Information about health department characteristics was reported by respondents, including whether the health department was the lead (or supporting) agency in their jurisdiction for capabilities. Respondents gave their opinion of the extent to which activities within each capability should be the responsibility of public health. Respondents identified significant deficiencies-defined as ways in which existing functions and capabilities may be incomplete, insufficient, or otherwise inadequate-for each existing capability, as well as topics that should be added as new capabilities. Finally, respondents were asked to assess the extent to which each of the capabilities was important for effective public health emergency response overall.
Respondents quantified various elements of structural capacity, including the following dimensions: human (e.g., total number of full-time equivalents [FTEs] working in public health preparedness, number of FTEs dedicated to evaluation of public health preparedness, reliance on CDC materials for evaluation, frequency of evaluation, frequency of evaluating improvement planning and corrective action items, and monitoring of subawardees' performance); fiscal (e.g., additional funding beyond the cooperative agreement); informational (e.g., partners and resources); and administrative preparedness (e.g., effectiveness of expedited hiring, receiving additional funds, obligating and spending funds, preparing financial records for audit, expedited purchasing, expedited contracting, and expedited legal and regulatory procedures). Respondents reported the number and extent of partnerships with a variety of organizations and agencies. Finally, respondents provided information about the leadership culture of their agency with regard to public health preparedness and response.
Focus Group
The sampling frame for the focus group consisted of the 48 survey respondents. The research team purposely selected 9 respondents to participate in a virtual focus group using the Adobe Connect webinar platform (Adobe Systems Incorporated, San Jose, CA). Criteria for selection included the respondent's level of engagement with the survey (e.g., the level of detail or descriptiveness in responses to open-ended survey questions) and organizational demographics (e.g., health department governance, region, and size).
The primary topics for discussion included semistructured questions about how awardees use the capabilities; what factors influence whether the health department leads or supports implementing the capability; how awardees implement capabilities that are not traditionally within the public health span of control; to what extent the capabilities capture activities that are viewed as important for preparedness and response; the challenges to using the capabilities; and how the capabilities could be improved or modified. Eight of 9 awardees participated in the 90-minute focus group held on May 17, 2016, including representatives from small, medium, and large jurisdictions; those with centralized, decentralized, and mixed governance health departments; and state, metropolitan, and territorial awardees.
Data Analysis
For the survey, we calculated descriptive statistics (e.g., mean, range, proportions) as appropriate for each item. We performed bivariate analyses to identify associations between structural characteristics and perception of the capabilities. Because this survey was a complete census of awardees, we did not use P values and confidence intervals to assess statistical significance. 23 The 90-minute focus group was facilitated by a trained moderator. The focus group was recorded, transcribed, and analyzed for key themes using inductive coding (i.e., there were no predetermined themes; themes emerged from the data through review and comparison).
RESULTS
Forty-eight of 62 PHEP directors (77%) completed the survey between September and November 2015.
Demographics of Respondents
More than half of the respondents (58.3%) held the job title of director ( Table 1) . The mean job tenure in public health preparedness was 10.6 years. Nearly 60% of respondents had 10 or more years of experience and had led 7 or more public health emergency responses.
The average number of deficiencies in the capabilities or their associated functions reported by all the survey respondents was 7.14 (range = 0-38). Among the 9 awardees selected to participate in the focus group, the average number of deficiencies was 15.4 (range = 7-37).
Contextual Factors
Leadership. Leadership creates and supports an organizational culture that facilitates meeting standards and successfully implementing new initiatives. 15 Health departments that reported a stronger culture of leadership (defined as a respondent with a leadership score greater than the mean of 3.1 on a 4-point Likert scale) were more likely to report a lead role (vs a support role) in 11 of 15 capabilities (Table 2) . Respondents with a stronger culture of leadership also ranked capabilities as extremely important for effective emergency response more frequently than respondents with a weaker leadership culture.
Partnerships. In addition to a strong culture of leadership, partnerships are critical to improving public health preparedness because public health agencies must be able to operate effectively under an "all hazards" approach and address an everevolving list of public health threats. 6 Strategic partnerships with a variety of agencies with different missions and strengths (including emergency management, law enforcement, and other first responders; mental and behavioral health agencies; health care providers; and community and faith-based organizations) are needed to maintain readiness across the 6 domains of the capabilities. 6, 14 The average number of partners reported was 14, and the average frequency of contact was monthly. At least 90% of respondents mentioned the following partners: state public health laboratory (97.9%), state epidemiologist (95.8%), emergency management (93.8%), and emergency medical services (89.6%).
Bivariate analyses found that health departments that reported more partners than the mean of 14 also reported higher levels of administrative preparedness, including expedited hiring (50.0% vs 38.9%), expedited contracting (39.3% vs 16.7%), and expedited waivers and other legal or regulatory procedures (14.3% vs 0%). Health departments with more than 14 partners also more frequently described themselves as "effective" or "extremely effective" at receiving additional federal funds (66.6% vs 57.1%) and in expedited purchasing (72.2% vs 60.7%). Health departments that reported more partners were more likely to take a lead role in 11 of 15 capabilities and more likely to rate each of the capabilities as "extremely important."
In the focus group, participants indicated that they used the capabilities as a way to develop and engage partners in certain areas of emphasis. As one explained, "We can reach out to our partners and gauge where we are in cooperation about coverage of some of those (capabilities)." Having capabilities not traditionally in the public health sphere helped respondents to build more substantive partnerships with other agencies that could provide leadership around these capabilities. As one participant said, "For nonpublic health capabilities, we are the facilitators. That's our role. We facilitate bringing partners together to work on a capability."
Organizational structure. The organizational structure of a health department, including size and governance structure, is cited in the literature as an important structural characteristic for PHEP. [17] [18] [19] Using secondary data to categorize governance structure and size, we assessed organizational attributes of health departments, including governance structure (centralized, decentralized, or mixed) and jurisdiction served (small, medium, large). 24, 25 More than half (52.1%) of the surveyed health departments reported a decentralized structure, whereas slightly more than one third (35.4%) were Analyses of health department structure and administrative preparedness revealed mixed results. Centralized health departments more frequently reported being "not at all effective" at expedited hiring (70.6%) than decentralized (32%) or mixed organizational structures (16.7%). Health departments that were decentralized or mixed were also more likely to report being effective or extremely effective at receiving additional funds from the federal government (64.0% and 66.6%, vs 58.8% for centralized) and expedited purchasing (80.0% and 66.6%, vs 41.2% for centralized). Furthermore, decentralized health departments were more likely to report being effective at obligating and spending down funds and preparing financial records for audit than centralized and mixed entities (72.0% vs 47.1% and 66.7%; 88.0% vs 70.6% and 83.4%).
Centralized health departments reported a higher overall percentage of perceived deficiencies within the capabilities (49.5%) compared with decentralized (45.8%) and mixed (4.7%) health departments. Centralized health departments were more likely to report deficiencies in the capabilities for emergency operations coordination, emergency public information and warning, information sharing, medical countermeasure dispensing, medical surge, nonpharmaceutical interventions, public health laboratory testing, and public health surveillance and epidemiological studies (Table 3 ). Similar to centralized departments, large health departments reported more deficiencies overall, as well as more deficiencies in the following capabilities: emergency operations coordination, emergency public information and warning, information sharing, medical materiel management and distribution, and responder health and safety.
In the focus group, decentralized health departments reported that the capabilities were particularly useful in issuing guidance and in monitoring local health departments, as well as developing objectives. As one participant explained: Resources and structural capacity. Structural capacity encompasses a variety of inputs to the public health system, including human, fiscal, informational, physical, and organizational resources. 14, 16, [19] [20] [21] Fiscal and human resources, such as number of staff and funding from additional sources, vary substantially. Respondents reported a mean of 45 FTE staff dedicated to PHEP (range = 2-151; median = 37). Nearly three quarters of respondents (72.9%) reported that their health department did not have additional sources of funding for public health preparedness beyond the PHEP cooperative agreement. Those without additional funding were more likely to take the lead or colead in executing 8 of the 15 capabilities and more likely to rate the capabilities as "extremely important," with the exception of mass care and volunteer management, which was more frequently rated as "extremely important" by those who did receive additional funding.
Mean additional funding received during the most recent fiscal year was $2.2 million (median = $500 000; range = $3500-$9 million). Many participants expressed concerns related to dedicating shrinking fiscal resources to capabilities outside the scope and jurisdiction of public health. As one participant stated: "One of the biggest frustrations is that things we are being asked to perform are far beyond the control of our group."
Data and evaluation. The ability of PHEP awardees to collect and use data to make them more effective at responding to public health threats is a critical element in improving their level of preparedness. 13, 16, 17 However, evaluation capacity varied widely among respondents. Awardees reported a mean of 9 FTE staff dedicated to evaluation (range = 0-93; Table 4 ). One fifth of the awardees (20.8%) reported that they relied on CDC evaluation metrics; most (72.9%) indicated that they relied on a combination of CDC metrics and their health department's metrics for evaluation.
DISCUSSION
Contextual factors, such as leadership, partnerships, and financial and human resources, affect awardees' perceptions of the capabilities as well as the effectiveness of the capabilities as a national standard for public health planning. Awardees described the capabilities as generally useful as guidance or a monitoring tool, but they struggle with the scope or authority to implement them all, depending in part on variation in the awardees' structural capacity. Bolstering awardees' leadership culture, the number of partnerships, or funding from outside resources may assist awardees in using the capabilities more effectively. For example, 1 in 4 jurisdictions reported a need for leadership development, which might be provided through mentorship from more experienced PHEP directors.
From fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2012, federal preparedness funds to state and local health departments from CDC were reduced by more than 38%, adjusted for inflation. 26 High turnover of public health officials, 27 changes in revenue and funding models for public health, 28 requirements of the Affordable Care Act, 29 and the need to ensure continuity of usual services-such as public health laboratory testing and public health Note. The respondents were Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) awardees from US state, city, and territorial health departments. A 4-point scale was used to measure the culture of leadership. a A weak culture of leadership refers to entities with a score less than the mean of 3.1 (of a possible 4.0). A strong culture of leadership refers to entities with a score equal to or greater than the mean. Variations in structural characteristics of health departments make it difficult to identify gaps that can be easily addressed across the board. For example, in this survey, health departments with centralized governance were more likely to report deficiencies in the content of the capabilities, as did the departments serving the largest populations. As centralized health departments retain authority over most decisions related to budget and the issuance of public health orders, this finding was somewhat surprising and may warrant further exploration.
Given diminishing resources, it may be beneficial to prioritize a subset of the 15 capabilities as core capabilities, with the remainder characterized as extended capabilities. Identifying overlapping capabilities (e.g., Homeland Security Grant Program) may help clarify roles among all sectors involved in emergency preparedness and response. Previously, the capabilities were organized in a 2-tier system, prioritizing capabilities that provided a strong foundation for public health preparedness such as laboratory testing, surveillance, and medical countermeasure dispensing. 30 Ideally, an integrated set of capabilities associated with the multiple funding streams that encompass public health, health systems, and emergency management would improve role clarity, foster collaboration, and support cross-sector planning.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. Although the response rate was 77%, it is possible that the opinions of nonrespondents differed from those of respondents. We found them not to differ in any measures we collected. Some respondents may have participated in the development of the capabilities and therefore might have presented a more favorable opinion of them. As respondents were preparedness program leaders, they may have viewed the task of rating their agency's leadership culture as essentially equivalent to rating their leadership ability, or they may have lacked awareness of leadership beyond their immediate management level, especially in larger agencies. Because the survey and focus group only included state, metropolitan, and territorial public health preparedness programs funded directly by CDC's PHEP Note. CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The respondents were Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) awardees from US state, city, and territorial health departments.
cooperative agreement, findings may not be generalizable to local health departments. The cross-sectional nature of the study makes it impossible to determine the temporal relationships between variables. For example, does having more partners lead to higher levels of administrative preparedness, or does a higher level of administrative preparedness enable successful partnerships? Lastly, factors such as size and relative funding levels of health departments could confound the relationships reported between number of partners or leadership culture and effectiveness in areas such as administrative preparedness. Further research may be needed to explore the causality underlying these observed relationships. PHEP and response research points to the difficulties in identifying evidence-based practices, developing performance measures and standards, and determining how findings can be applied to real-world responses. [31] [32] [33] [34] On the basis of this study, the current capabilities can be used to address these challenges. For example, more than 80% of awardees report using the capabilities to evaluate the work of subawardees. Because there are no CDC-defined performance measures for some of the capabilities and functions, developing them may enhance awardees' utilization of the capabilities for evaluation. 6 However, any benefits must be weighed against the data collection and reporting burden placed on programs, which is already significant.
Conclusions
Although PHEP awardees do not feel that the current capabilities are the "end all, be all," they consistently agree that the capabilities are useful and effective. The capabilities are seen as a valuable guidance document that provides awardees with a "road map" and "framework," regardless of jurisdictional size or organizational structure. Because awardees generally feel that the capabilities are important to facilitating the measurement of progress over time, they probably should not be significantly altered at this time through the addition or elimination of capabilities. Rather, targeted updates-such as the creation of performance measures or novel evaluation methods for additional functions-could be undertaken. Publication, presentation, or documentation of best practices by awardees within different contexts (e.g., success stories in expediting funding or contracting) could also be encouraged to build the evidence base. Targeted technical assistance provided by awardees to their peers could help replicate successes. The flexibility inherent in the capabilities and their associated functions, tasks, and resource elements means that awardees can use the capabilities in ways that are most helpful to them; for example, for recruiting partners to take the lead in areas typically considered outside the authority of public health, for conducting evaluation or training, or for issuing guidance and monitoring local health department subcontracts. These are fruitful areas for further exploration and may lead to opportunities for evidence-based program improvement.
